Showing posts with label pseudo-paradox. Show all posts
Showing posts with label pseudo-paradox. Show all posts

Thursday, October 25, 2012

“Quiz time!” Recap

Last week's Quiz time! post about the Allais Paradox generated the most diverse and on-topic set of reader comments for a JEC post in awhile, so today I'm going to recap.

What I neglected to mention in last week's post is that a lot of people answer A-B-A or A-B-B rather than one of the two rational sets of answers, A-A-A or B-B-B. One explanation for this phenomenon is a psychological effect called the certainty effect.

The certainty effect happens when a person assigns a premium to a certain outcome for the sake of certainty. For example, imagine you have a 100% chance of winning $1 million. Now imagine your chance of winning decreases to 90%. How much worse do you feel at 90% than you did at 100%? Now further imagine your chance of winning decreases to 80%. How much worse do you feel at 80% than you did at 90%. Many people feel the change from 100% to 90% more acutely than they do the change from 90% to 80%, and they're willing to pay a premium for it. A common rationale is that the 100% chance is a sure thing while both 90% and 80% aren't sure things. Nevertheless, the decrease in probabilistic value from 100% to 90% is the same as the decrease from 90% to 80%. Objectively, if we were playing only the odds, we wouldn't favor certainty for the sake of certainty.

But should we play only the odds? There's more than one way to look at it.

Firstly, there's subjectivity in any chancy game. As last week's first question showed, some people would prefer to keep a sure $1 million, while some people would prefer to give up one of those percentage points to gain 10 percentage points of chance of doubling their winnings. But if you were strictly playing the numbers, then you would always pick the 10-for-1.

\[ (89\% \times \$1 \text{ million}) + (10\% \times \$2 \text{ million}) = \$1.09 \text{ million} \]

But to many people, the extra $0.09 million isn't worth risking $1 million—no matter what the odds are. They value winning differently than, say, a billionaire who likes thrills.

However, though we expect different people to value risk differently, we might expect everyone to be consistent with respect to their own risk valuations. But often this isn't the case, and that's what the three questions in last week's post together show when people say they would tolerate a 1 percentage point smaller chance of winning only when that decrease is from 11% to 10% and not when it's from 100% to 99%. That's akin to saying that sometimes the extra $0.09 million is worth risking $1 million for, but sometimes it isn't.

Is there a good reason to waver on that choice?

Thursday, October 18, 2012

Quiz time!

Quiz time! Don't worry, there are no wrong answers. But please think about and answer each question in turn, before moving on to the next question.

Question #1: Which of the following would you prefer to have?

(A) A 100% chance of winning $1 million

— or —

(B) An 89% chance of winning $1 million, a 10% chance of winning $2 million, and a 1% chance of winning nothing?

Question #2: Which of the following would you prefer to have?

(A) An 11% chance of winning $1 million and an 89% chance of winning nothing

— or —

(B) A 10% chance of winning $2 million and a 90% chance of winning nothing?

Question #3: For this question, imagine there's a box in front of you. You have no idea what's in the box: It could be something good, such as a billion dollars; or it could be something bad, such as a poisonous spider; or it could be something neutral, such as a used pencil. With that in mind, which of the following would you prefer to have?

(A) An 89% chance of winning whatever is in the box and an 11% chance of winning $1 million

— or —

(B) An 89% chance of winning whatever is in the box, a 10% chance of winning $2 million, and a 1% chance of winning nothing?


If by now you suspect these are trick questions, you're right. While there's no wrong way to answer the questions, all the questions taken together have only two rational sets of answers: all A or all B. Any mixing of A and B answers leads to a contradiction. Here's why.

The first question is entirely based on preference: would you rather have the sure thing or take a small risk to go for a bigger gain? There's no correct answer.

Question #2 phrases the same question differently by removing an 89% chance of winning $1 million from each choice. However, for many people who answerA to Question #1, the same choice seems too prudent for Question #2. Why increase your chance of winning by a mere percentage point at the cost of giving up half the winnings?

Question #3 shows the similarity between the two previous questions by replacing the missing 89% chance with a mystery box. The box shouldn't affect your answer because both the A and B answers give an identical 89% chance to win the box. So you should decide which answer to pick based on the remaining odds: an 11% chance to win $1 million versus a 10% chance to win $2 million—the same choice in Question #2.

However, the contradiction is that the same reasoning works for Question #1, too. To see that, imagine that Question #1 were phrased as follows:

Question #1-B: Which of the following would you prefer to have?

(A) An 89% chance of winning 1$ million and an 11% chance of winning $1 million

— or —

(B) An 89% chance of winning $1 million, a 10% chance of winning $2 million, and a 1% chance of winning nothing?

Question #1-B is the same as Question #1, and it's also the same as Question #3 but with the mystery box replaced with $1 million. Therefore, based on the similarity we already established between Question #2 and Question #3, all three questions are asking the same thing with the one difference of what's being offered at an 89% chance: $1 million, nothing, or a mystery box. And the 89% chance shouldn't affect your choice in any of your answers, so therefore you should choose the same answer for all three questions.

If you live on Planet Rational.

These questions make up what's called the Allais Paradox. I've lifted it from another William Poundstone book I've started reading—this one called Priceless: The Myth of Fair Value (and How to Take Advantage of It).