Last week I described how the rational self-interest theory is self-defeating when it's combined with the belief that one ought to be never self-denying. I described Parfit's example of the car breaking down in the desert at night and how it was better for the stranded person to be trustworthy than to be never self-denying. However, this example doesn't mean that rational self-interest—abbreviated hereafter as S, as in the book—is always self-defeating. Rather, it means that S tells a person to be self-denying at least in some circumstances. If a person is never self-denying anyway, despite what S says, then it's the fault of the person, not the theory.
But what if a person's belief in S causes that person, mistakenly, to become never self-denying? Would S be at fault? Would S fail in its own terms? Before answering that question, I'll explain why the situation it describes is plausible.
There are many ways to be incompetent at following S. Some ways are tractable. For example, I may believe that I'm overall better off eating broccoli, but instead I succumb to temptation and eat a donut. This is entirely my own fault, caused by the straightforward human failure of valuing the present too much over the future. My failure wasn't in any way caused by S or my belief in S. Theoretically, I could have had a stronger will and better followed my own interests.
But some other ways of being incompetent at following S are intractable. Sometimes, as an adherent to S, my failure to do what's in my own self-interest may be the result of my inability to assess a complex situation well and to accurately predict the future. For example, I might believe as a young person that I'm better off making a lot of money and as a result choose spend my prime years working long, hard hours. But maybe that choice turns out wrong and my life would have, in fact, gone better if I had spent more time with my friends and family. While my choice follows from incompetence at following S, it's impossible to blame my failure on any single, straightforward mistake, such as with a failure to reject temptation. Rather, I made a choice as a young man that seemed best at the time and that only after many years of experience proved bad. This scenario, and others like it, are too plausible to be passed off as mere incompetence; we must judge S according to the reality that we're dealing with imperfect humans.
Let's now return to the question: what if a person's belief in S causes that person, mistakenly, to become wrongly self-denying, such as with devoting one's life to a bad pursuit? Would S be at fault? Would S fail in its own terms?
The answer is no. In that circumstance, where otherwise my belief in S causes me to make my life go worse for me by motivating me to work too hard, S tells me to not believe in S. That is, S gives me reason to believe in some other theory, one that leads to the consequence of me choosing to spend more time with friends and family. In this case, S is said to be self-effacing: it tells us to believe in some other theory.
We may want the best ethical theory to be not self-effacing, but that's irrelevant to whether the best ethical actually is self-effacing. It may very well be that the ethical theory that makes our lives go best also happens to give us reason to believe in some entirely different ethical theory. Some people find this to be a discomforting or depressing idea; they feel that the best ethical theory ought to be aligned with our beliefs about truth, that a belief in the truth will also be a belief in the best ethical theory. However, this is a preference—and possibly one that the universe doesn't fulfill—and not a valid objection to S.
But one objection that is valid is the concern that it might be impossible for a person to reject S and to change their disposition, even when doing so is necessary for them to make their lives go best. For example, that person whose car broke down in the desert might be too attached to believing in S and, furthermore, stuck on being never self-denying, with no realistic possibility of changing their mind otherwise. Would such a scenario cause S to fail?
I'll pick up here next week.
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