I glossed over the two terms last week, but the linchpin of Thomism is its distinction between efficient causes and final causes, which together and only together explain change.
An efficient cause is that which actualizes a thing's potential property. For example, cheese melts when heated, with melted-ness being the cheese's potential property made actual and heat being the efficient cause, or actualizing agent, of the change. A final cause, on the other hand, is the end purpose of such actualization. In the same example, cheese melts when heated because the end purpose of heat as applied to cheese is for cheese to melt.
A lot more can be said about efficient causes and final causes, and usually a lot more is, but the previous paragraph provides the gist. As for efficient and final causes' place in modernity, science of the last few centuries conditionally accepts the notion of efficient causes, though in the jargon they're referred to as causes,
but it dismisses final causes, regarding them as lying outside science's domain. And this brings me my main point.
One problem with beginning a book with a chapter on metaphysics is that the author alienates most readers who don't start the book already agreeing with most of what the author has to say. It turns out metaphysical reality is a lot like pornography: we know it when we see it, but when pressed for precision, our opinions often differ. That's to say we each have our intuitive notions how the universe works, but nature at extremely small and big scales, as measured either in size or complexity, eludes descriptions that are both exact and predictive. And if you make a claim that's inexact or non-predictive, then you invite people who disagree with you to continue disagreeing.
Another word for predictiveness is falsifiability. Thomism is non-falsifiable, and I gather as much from the first dozen pages in Edward Feser's book. This doesn't surprise me; a key attitudinal difference between religious-minded folk and science-minded folk is how important they think it is for claims to have the capacity of being proved wrong. Religion values falsifiability little or none at all while science depends upon it. The end. It's not even worth getting into a discussion about the value of falsifiability itself because values are themselves non-falsifiable. Suffice it to say, either you think falsifiability is important or you don't. Those who think it is start with that as their axiom—albeit, one that's a self-referential paradox—and run with it as far as the evidence goes. Those who think falsifiability isn't important run even further.
Let's take an example. Suppose I claim there exists alien intelligence on the other side of the galaxy. My claim is, practically speaking, not a falsifiable claim. Though it can be shown to be true by way of evidence—for example, by receiving an alien radio transmission or by being visited by green men in flying saucers—it's beyond our ability to prove the claim false. Despite any lack of evidence for alien intelligence, there remains the possibility that the alien intelligence remains unobserved because it's well hidden though nevertheless out there somewhere. So in a way my claim is safe. When asked to defend it, I might say, You can't prove me wrong,
or No one has ever proved me wrong.
That ends the conversation—or the useful portion of it, anyway—because you can't prove me wrong. Whether alien intelligence exists across the galaxy from us is doomed to speculative judgment so long as (1) humankind hasn't yet observed positive evidence and (2) humankind hasn't ruled out every possible alien-intelligence-sized happening 100,000 light years away—and we can't do that even for the nearest stars.
Is not being proved wrong a defense? I don't think so. That's because I value falsifiability. Unless already interested in the topic, I don't care about the validity of your claim X, any X, if it doesn't predict some future, testable event. Claiming there exists intelligence across the galaxy from us doesn't tell us anything about the future: the aliens may remain hidden forever or tomorrow they may show up and solve our nonrenewable-resource crisis with their Mr. Zero-Point Energy devices. The claim about aliens works with any possible tomorrow because the claim doesn't say what tomorrow will look like.
But a lot of people do think not being proved wrong constitutes a valid defense. You who're reading this post may very well be one of them: someone who sees things differently than I do and who cares about non-falsifiable claims—or at least a few specific ones. That's OK. I doubt valuing falsifiability as I do is the best choice for all people because I doubt it allows an individual on average to live his or her life better. In any event my goal with these Monday religion posts isn't to change opinions but rather to sharpen them; my goal today is for you to understand the distinction between falsifiable claims and non-falsifiable claims. Just as you wouldn't expect to be understood if you continued speaking English to someone who doesn't understand English, you should recognize when you're talking to someone who values falsifiability and alter your expectations for the conversation accordingly. It's up to you whether that means saying something different than what you would say when around like-minded people or instead forcing no replacement upon silence. But rarely if ever will insisting the other person stop caring about falsifiability do either of you much good.
In my opinion, the point of studying philosophy is not to be brought closer to the truth—whatever that means!—nor is it to argue a few particular points better. Rather, the point is to be able to argue all points better, not because you believe any of them, but because by being able to better argue for something you don't believe, you enter the minds of people who disagree with you and thus improve at communicating with them—at teaching them and learning from them. Can one love wisdom any more?
Some people may say, Yes, Craig,
By now if you can't see how I see such a question as irrelevant, then probably nothing I write about these matters will ever make much sense to you. That's OK. That needn't end the conversation just yet: next week I'll write specifically about Thomism metaphysics.rah rah empathy
sounds goods, but the question whether there exists alien intelligence on the other side of the galaxy has a definite, true-or-false answer. Falsifiable or not, there's a decision to make here.
5 comments:
Something in this reminded me of the following passage from Chesterton, which I was reading yesterday:
"But what we suffer from to-day is humility in the wrong place. Modesty has moved from the organ of ambition. Modesty has settled upon the organ of conviction; where it was never meant to be. A man was meant to be doubtful about himself, but undoubting about the truth; this has been exactly reversed. Nowadays the part of a man that a man does assert is exactly the part he ought not to assert—himself. The part he doubts is exactly the part he ought not to doubt—the Divine Reason. Huxley preached a humility content to learn from Nature. But the new sceptic is so humble that he doubts if he can even learn. Thus we should be wrong if we had said hastily that there is no humility typical of our time. The truth is that there is a real humility typical of our time; but it so happens that it is practically a more poisonous humility than the wildest prostrations of the ascetic. The old humility was a spur that prevented a man from stopping; not a nail in his boot that prevented him from going on. For the old humility made a man doubtful about his efforts, which might make him work harder. But the new humility makes a man doubtful about his aims, which will make him stop working altogether.
At any street corner we may meet a man who utters the frantic and blasphemous statement that he may be wrong. Every day one comes across somebody who says that of course his view may not be the right one. Of course his view must be the right one, or it is not his view. We are on the road to producing a race of men too mentally modest to believe in the multiplication table. We are in danger of seeing philosophers who doubt the law of gravity as being a mere fancy of their own. Scoffers of old time were too proud to be convinced; but these are too humble to be convinced. The meek do inherit the earth; but the modern sceptics are too meek even to claim their inheritance. It is exactly this intellectual helplessness which is our second problem."
Perhaps not exactly to your point, but food for thought.
Josh— Thanks for sharing.
One's sworn enemy on any ideological battlefield isn't he who believes the opposite, but rather he who believes nothing at all.
Nice post Craig.
Since I'm late to this post, I'll keep it short.
I propose we partition the general population into three buckets, not two, with regards to their take on falsifiability:
1. Those who value falsifiability.
2. Those who don't value falsifiability.
3. Those who don't *understand* falsifiability.
Perhaps there are people who think they're in bucket #2, when in fact they are in bucket #3. Bertrand Russell was successful at highlighting this potential confusion using his Teapot analogy.
I have adopted a similar analogy - "Shafik's invisible donkey". When I find myself in an argument with someone that claims to be in bucket #2, I immediately stop the conversation and posit that there is an invisible donkey in the room, right now, and that I'm the only one who is able to interact-with or observe it in any way. This usually leads to a discussion of *what* falsifiability is.
It takes some degree of training to be in bucket #1; it's something that is learned, and perhaps not so much an "intrinsic aspect" of a person. Some people will indeed make an "educated decision" to be in bucket #2. However, there will be many others that don't actually grasp the underlying concept very well, and who would hop into bucket #1 after being presented with a clear enough explanation of what falsifiability is.
Shafik— Your "invisible donkey" adds a Middle Eastern flair to the discussion, no doubt.
How many people are in bucket #3 who, given a clear explanation of falsifiability, would jump to bucket #1? We both agree bucket #3 is huge, but I suspect the number of potential "converts" is small. I base this partly on my own example: I grew up secular and liked science stuff long before I learned that falsifiability is what distinguishes science from philosophy, and so my current position of valuing falsifiability followed my preexisting attitude towards science. To generalize this to other people: I don't think people first say, "Oh, I think from now on I'm going to value (or not value) falsifiability," and then change their world view accordingly. Rather, people first adopt the world view that's most congruent to their gut feelings, and then they base their opinion of falsifiability on that world view. And to be clear about it, I see this causal relationship going strongly both ways, both pro-science and other.
In all, this is a core idea underlying the post about myth and meaning.
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